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MOVING THE LINES:  THE COMMON LAW OF 
UTILITY RELOCATION 
Michael L. Stokes* 
The system of streets and roads serving the United States is over four 
million miles long and occupies about one percent of the country’s total 
land mass—an area roughly the size of South Carolina.1  The most 
obvious users of this intricate network are the cars and trucks that log 
over 990 billion miles a year in vehicle-miles traveled.2  Less noticeable 
are the utility lines, often located to the side of the pavement or 
underground, that use these transportation corridors for tasks ranging 
from transmission of fiber optic data to collection of sewage. 
If a road is widened to allow for more traffic, or a city street is 
rerouted for construction of a convention center, the utility lines may 
have to be moved.  This can be an expensive undertaking.  During 
construction of the Westpark Tollway in Houston, for example, the cost 
to relocate electric and gas utilities exceeded $10 million.3  Telephone line 
relocation for the same project cost another $1.5 million.4 
Determining who has to pay these costs is a frequent source of 
litigation, sometimes with inconsistent results.  For example, in one 2006 
decision resulting from the Westpark Tollway project, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that Texas statutory law would 
require the government to pay for relocating electric and gas lines being 
displaced by the new road.5  But three years later, in another case arising 
from the same project, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Fifth 
Circuit’s “Erie guess about Texas law” was wrong, deciding that the 
telephone company had to pay to move its own lines as required by 
longstanding Texas common law.6 
“Under the traditional common-law rule,” reaffirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1983 and recognized by the Court as far back as 1905, 
“utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a 
                                                 
* J.D., Ohio State University (1995); M.A., Industrial Relations, Wayne State University 
(1983); B.A., Economics and Political Science, University of Michigan–Dearborn (1981).  Mr. 
Stokes is an attorney practicing in Toledo, Ohio. 
1 Distance to Nearest Road in the Coterminous United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, available at http://www.fort.usgs.gov/products/publications/ 
21426/21426.pdf. 
2 Functional System Travel–2008, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., available 
at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2008/pdf/vm2.pdf. 
3 Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec., L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 
542 (5th Cir. 2006). 
4 Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth. v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 263 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. App. 2006). 
5 Centerpoint Energy, 436 F.3d at 551. 
6 Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 63–65 (Tex. 2009). 
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public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local 
authorities.”7  But affected utilities, facing large and unwanted 
expenditures, have persistently found ways to argue around or against 
this rule, and courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply it. 
The abundance of litigation related to government-mandated utility 
relocation is not surprising.  When a government agency requires a 
utility company to move its equipment from the right-of-way and 
disclaims any responsibility to pay for it, the order might seem like an 
uncompensated taking, and this argument commonly arises in utility 
relocation cases.8  Moreover, utilities often have government-granted 
franchises, dating to the late 1800s or before, that authorize them to put 
equipment in the streets but say nothing about relocation.9  And because 
utility companies are subject to a host of state and federal regulations, 
they may urge that the common law rule is no longer valid because state 
regulation has displaced it10 or federal law has preempted it.11  Finally, 
given the amount of money at stake, it is predictable that utilities resist 
uncompensated relocation and try to put the burden on the 
governmental agency to justify it.12 
This Article will begin by examining how the common law rule 
developed as utilities began to use the streets and highways for gas and 
water service and street railways, and then how the rule was affected by 
the massive growth of the country’s federally-funded highway system.  
Second, we will look at the various arguments made against application 
of the common law rule and how they have fared.  Third, we will 
consider the particular issues that arise when private development and 
government actions are intertwined in the project that made the 
relocation necessary.  Finally, this Article will suggest that a “clear 
statement rule” would help sort out the legal complexities in this area:  
                                                 
7 Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 
30, 35 (1983) (quoting New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 
U.S. 453, 462 (1905)). 
8 See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler, 217 P.3d 424, 426–27 (Ariz. App. 2009); City 
of Perrysburg v. Toledo Edison Co., 870 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ohio App. 2007); Sw. Bell, 282 
S.W.3d at 60–61. 
9 See, e.g., Qwest Corp., 217 P.3d at 427; Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 711 
P.2d 119, 128–30 (Or. 1985). 
10 See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting 
Qwest’s argument that state public utilities regulations displaced the common law rule). 
11 See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
the argument that Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted the common law 
rule). 
12 See, e.g., Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 502 
F. Supp. 2d 747, 760–62 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the 
City of Manitowoc, 2008 Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *9 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18, 
2008). 
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because the common law “utility pays” rule is so well-established, it 
should be applied unless a state statute clearly requires otherwise. 
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RULE 
A. The Early Cases 
Building and maintaining municipal streets and roads between 
population centers is one of the “ancient purposes of organized 
government.”13  For much of history, these ways were traveled by foot, 
either human or animal.  By the mid-1800s, however, street railway 
systems began to operate, some horse-drawn and others powered by 
electrical or steam engines.  Unlike transient carriages or wagons, street 
railways required fixed, permanent tracks, and the laying of these tracks 
also laid the potential for conflicts with other uses of the road.  Yet from 
the earliest days, courts regularly determined that it was the secondary 
user of the street, and not the organized government, that had to yield. 
In 1863, for example, the Kentucky legislature authorized the city of 
Louisville to contract for the construction of street railroads, and in 1864, 
the legislature incorporated the Louisville City Railway Company to 
build and operate street railways at locations authorized by the city 
council.14  After agreeing with the city to the terms of a contract, this 
privately-owned railway company laid over twenty-four miles of track—
costing nearly $400,000—and began operations.15 
Soon afterward, however, the city decided to begin using different 
pavement on some of its streets, notifying the company that it would 
have to remove and replace 1280 yards of track on Jefferson Street as the 
new paving progressed.16  The company did the work under protest and 
sued to challenge the city’s action.  On review, the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals first had to determine whether the city could even require the 
company to remove its tracks from the street.  If so, the court would then 
have to decide whether the city or the company should pay for it.  To 
answer the first question the court looked at the legislature’s 1863 
enabling act, which required the “[city] council to reserve the right to 
                                                 
13 Hendricks v. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co., 6 S.W.2d 1050, 1052 (Ky. 1928); see 
also Bester v. Chi. Transit Auth., 676 F. Supp. 833, 838 (N.D. Ill. 1987).  “One of the most 
ancient and habitually exercised functions of government for centuries has been providing 
of roads and streets for use by the public and keeping them free from obstructions, 
regulating traffic over and upon them, so that the public might get the maximum of safe 
use thereof.”  Superior Laundry & Towel Supply Co. v. Cincinnati, 168 N.E.2d 447, 448 
(Ohio App. 1959). 
14 Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of Louisville, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 415, 417 (1871). 
15 Id. at 418. 
16 Id. at 418–19. 
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regulate and control” the railroad.17  That reserved right, the court 
decided, was broad enough to encompass the repaving project.  As the 
court put it, “the municipal government may, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, make reasonable and proper regulations, prescribing the 
manner in which this right of way shall be enjoyed.”18  And while the 
city’s powers to regulate were expressly reserved in this instance, the 
court also noted the “fundamental principle that these powers are 
impliedly reserved . . . in all its grants of property to private 
individuals.”19 
Turning to the second question, the court held that the company 
must bear the cost of relocating its tracks.  The court based this decision 
on a fundamental principle: 
[just as the city] council could not by contract deprive 
itself of the power to regulate the reconstruction of 
railways made necessary by changes in the character of 
pavements used upon the streets of the city, neither 
could it embarrass or clog its right to exercise such 
power by undertaking, either expressly or by 
implication, to pay the expenses necessarily incurred by 
the company in complying with the reasonable and 
proper regulations made by the city upon this subject.20 
Furthermore, the court declared that it would presume that the city acted 
reasonably in exercising its legislative power.21 
The Kentucky court’s decision also involved sub-surface rights:  
specifically, the city of Louisville’s power to require the company to 
remove its tracks (and replace them at its own cost) for a sewer project.  
That relocation, too, was an exercise of the city’s inherent and inalienable 
power to control the streets for the public benefit.  As the court put it, 
“we are of [the] opinion that the city did not and could not surrender its 
right to construct sewers in such portions of its limits as might require 
them, and that the railway company holds its right of way subject to this 
power.”22 
                                                 
17 Id. at 421. 
18 Id. at 421–22. 
19 Id. at 422. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 423.  The Alabama Supreme Court followed Louisville City Railway in an 1890 
case ordering a water company to remove and lower pipes that conflicted with a city 
sewer, even though the pipes allegedly were located as the city’s engineer had directed.  
City Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co., 9 So. 339 (Ala. 1890).  Due to the 
fact that liability for cost was not relevant to the mandamus action, the Alabama court 
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During this same time period, courts in several other jurisdictions 
used similar reasoning to determine that, franchise rights 
notwithstanding, the government could order a utility to relocate at its 
own cost whatever facilities it put in or under the public highways.  In 
1873, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the county 
commissioners could authorize a steam railroad to lay its tracks across 
the tracks of a horse railroad when both occupied the same highway, for 
both railroads “hold their rights to use [the highway] in subordination to 
the power of the public authorities to determine what other use of it is 
demanded by public necessity.”23 
In 1883, one year after Thomas Edison installed his first small-scale 
electricity distribution network in part of Manhattan,24 the New York 
Court of Appeals held in In re Deering that the city of New York could 
not assess property taxes to reimburse a gas company for expenses 
incurred in removing and replacing an illuminating gas line that had to 
be moved when the grade of the street was changed.  Even though an 
1848 act of the state legislature authorized the gas company to lay its 
pipes under the public streets, the court held that “the company took the 
risk of their location and should be required to make such changes as 
public convenience or security requires, and at its own cost and 
charge.”25 
                                                                                                             
deferred ruling on whether the city was “under a moral or legal obligation to pay [the] 
expense [of relocating the pipes],” but it signaled that the answer would probably be no.  
Id. at 341.  Quoting the Kentucky court’s opinion, the Alabama court indicated its approval 
of the general principle that a city could not “embarrass or clog its right to exercise” police 
power over the streets by undertaking to pay to relocate utilities using the public right-of-
way.  Id. 
23 Lynn & Bos. R.R. Co. v. Bos. & Lowell R.R. Corp., 114 Mass. 88, 91 (1873). 
24 PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID 29–39 (2007). 
25 In re Deering, 93 N.Y. 361, 362 (1883).  In 1892, the Supreme Court of Virginia followed 
Deering and Louisville City Railway and refused to enjoin the city of Roanoke from lowering 
the grade of a street, even though it meant that gas lines would have to be relocated.  
Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810 (1892).  The Virginia court suggested that 
the utility had no valid claim for damages, for it accepted its franchise contract “with full 
knowledge not only that the city retained the power to change the grade of its streets as in 
its judgment and discretion the public welfare might require, but also of a probability of 
such change in a new city such as Roanoke.”  Id. at 818. 
 The Florida Supreme Court reached a similar result when it decided that a public 
contract for a sewer system was void because the task of relocating utilities was included in 
the description of the work being bid.  Anderson v. Fuller, 41 So. 684, 688 (Fla. 1906).  Thus, 
[t]he city of Tampa was, therefore, not authorized directly or indirectly 
to burden itself or its citizens with the cost of removing and replacing 
of the water pipes, gas pipes, telegraph, telephone and electric light 
poles, drains, or conduits, or railway tracks that might necessarily have 
been interfered with in laying its sewers in the streets. 
Id. 
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Another illustrative decision—made by a federal court—arose in 
Kansas City, Missouri, where a city sewer dug in 1884 displaced a water 
line laid just one year before by the National Water-Works Company.  
The water company contended that, because it had laid its water line in 
the street “in the place and manner directed by the city,” it had acquired 
“a vested property right in an undisturbed location and possession.”26  
But the court disagreed, stating that under well-established law no city 
could make a contract that abridged its full control of matters affecting 
the public health.27  This rule governed the contract between the city and 
the utility, which “took its right to lay its pipes in the streets of the city 
subject to the paramount and inalienable right of the city to construct 
sewers therein whenever and wherever, in its judgment, the public 
interest demand.”28 
By the end of the nineteenth century multiple utility lines in the 
streets had become commonplace and so had the recognition that 
governments could order those lines to be relocated at the cost of the 
companies that owned them.  As the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1893 
Columbus Gaslight & Coke opinion held, any easement or other right that a 
utility might have to use the streets “must give way to the paramount 
duty of the city to care for the streets, and keep them open, in repair, and 
convenient for the general public.”29  And so long as the city’s action was 
not wanton or negligent, the utility would have to pay to move its lines.30  
The court reasoned, 
[t]his duty would be seriously interfered with if the city 
could not change the grade of its streets save upon the 
condition that it should make compensation to every gas 
company, and water company, and telephone company, 
and electric light company, and street-railway company, 
for inconvenience and expense thereby occasioned.  All 
such agencies must be held to take their grants from the 
city upon the condition, implied where not expressed, 
that the city reserves the full and unconditional power to 
make any reasonable change of grade or other 
improvement in its streets.31 
                                                 
26 Nat’l Water-Works Co. v. City of Kansas, 28 F. 921, 921, 922 (W.D. Mo. 1886). 
27 Id. at 923. 
28 Id. 
29 Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 33 N.E. 292, 294 (Ohio 1893). 
30 Id. at 294. 
31 Id. 
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Nor were conflicts between multiple users of the road strictly an 
urban phenomenon.  In 1903, the commissioners of Sandusky County, 
Ohio ordered a telegraph company to move its poles from the center of a 
rural highway to the edge because heavily loaded farm wagons had to 
dodge between them to avoid traffic on a recently installed electric 
interurban railway.32  Because this highway was a federally funded post 
road, the telegraph company asked the federal court to enjoin the order, 
arguing that the federal statute deprived the commissioners of authority 
to require it to move the lines—foreshadowing preemption arguments 
made a century later.  But then, as now, the federal government deferred 
to local control of public road rights-of-way; the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held that the statute authorizing telegraph lines on federal 
post roads “was not intended by its passage to interfere with the proper 
control and regulation of such highways by the states, counties, or 
municipalities, which had them in charge.”33 
Alternatively, the telegraph company argued that because it had 
paid the county for the right to use the highway and installed its poles 
where it had been authorized to put them, it had “a right to maintain its 
poles and wires where they are indefinitely.”34  But the federal appeals 
court was not persuaded: 
It is enough to say in reply to this, that the county 
commissioners had no power to grant such a right or 
franchise.  Their power was limited.  They had a right to 
permit the telegraph company to maintain its poles and 
wires in the road, provided they should not incommode 
the public in its use, but that was the extent of their 
power.35 
Moreover, there was no guarantee that the poles could stay where they 
were first installed.  “A location not inconvenient when made, may 
become so because of changed conditions; and whether it has or not, 
must be ascertained by the commissioners in office when the inquiry is 
made.  No board has power to determine for all time just how a highway 
shall be used.”36 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, two well-
recognized principles governed how utilities could use the public rights-
of-way.  First, the utility’s right to be there was a subordinate one, so the 
                                                 
32 Ganz v. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 140 F. 692, 694 (6th Cir. 1905). 
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government authority responsible for maintaining the street or road 
could order the utility to relocate its facilities.  Second, this relocation 
would be at the utility’s cost.  To hold otherwise would “embarrass or 
clog” public control of the roads and hamper the government’s ability to 
respond to future public needs by making change too costly.37  And this 
result was a fair one, because by using the public right-of-way the utility 
company saved the time and money it would otherwise have spent 
acquiring easements for its lines.  The utility company took the risk of 
locating its lines in the streets; therefore, it must also bear the cost of 
moving them when the government required it. 
It was against this background that the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
New Orleans Gaslight, which has come to be considered a seminal 
decision on the subject. 
B. The Supreme Court’s 1905 New Orleans Gaslight Decision 
The dawn of the nineteenth century saw some halting attempts at 
providing water to the public through pipes laid in the streets,38 but the 
first prototypical “utilities” were companies that produced and 
distributed coal gas for illuminating streets and buildings.39  One of these 
was New Orleans Gaslight and Banking Company, which was created in 
1835 and given the right, for a term of years, to use the streets of New 
Orleans as the city’s exclusive vendor of illuminating gas.40 
The Gaslight Company first came before the Supreme Court in 1885 
seeking to defend its exclusive rights against a legislatively sanctioned 
competitor.  The Court began its decision in that case by finding that the 
grant of a monopoly was not improper because the company was not in 
competition with ordinary citizens: 
                                                 
37  Supra note 22. 
38 See ROBERT DALEY, THE WORLD BENEATH THE CITY 28 (1959) (stating that in 1799 the 
Manhattan Company, headed by Aaron Burr, obtained legislative authority to provide 
water to the city of New York).  Moreover, 
Burr and the Manhattan Company negotiated for the site of 
Christopher Colles’ old well and reservoir adjacent to Collect Pond, 
ordered thousands of feet of log pipe bored, and sent laborers into the 
principal streets to break up the pavement.  When the log pipes were 
ready they were buried five feet down, two feet from the curb.  For the 
first time, New York City, like any growing organism, had pushed 
roots down into the earth. 
Id. 
39 See id. at 116 (stating that New York City’s original gas charter was granted in the 
spring of 1823). 
40 New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 651–52 (1885). 
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No one has the right to dig up the streets, and lay down 
gas-pipes, erect lamp-posts, and carry on the business of 
lighting the streets and the houses of the city of New 
Orleans, without special authority from the sovereign.  It 
is a franchise belonging to the state, and, in the exercise 
of the police power, the state could carry on the business 
itself or select one or several agents to do so.41 
But once it was built out, the utility franchise became a right; without the 
assurance of an exclusive privilege for a fixed time, no private company 
would have undertaken the risk of building a gas-works and laying the 
distribution lines.42  Therefore, if the state legislature later decided that 
such grants of monopoly power were a bad idea, it could revoke the 
exclusive privilege.  However, it could not revoke it under the guise of 
the police power, for “the exclusiveness of a grant has no relation 
whatever to the public health, or to the public safety.”43  Instead, it 
would have to take the company’s exclusive right by eminent domain 
and pay it just compensation in return.44 
Having once successfully defended its rights against governmental 
action, the Company probably felt it could do so again when a state-
created drainage commission ordered it to relocate some of its gas pipes.  
So in the 1905 New Orleans Gaslight case, the Company argued that 
having acquired the franchise and availed itself of the 
right to locate its pipes under the streets of the city, it 
has thereby acquired a property right which cannot be 
taken from it by a shifting of some of its mains and pipes 
from their location to accommodate the drainage system, 
without compensation for the cost of such changes.45 
But the Supreme Court drew an important distinction between the 
franchise itself, in which the company had a compensable right, and the 
particular location of its pipes in the streets, in which it did not.  Unlike 
the decision to disavow a state-chartered monopoly, the decision to 
install a drainage system was an exercise of the police power, and that 
                                                 
41 Id. at 659–60 (quoting Crescent City Gaslight Co. v. New Orleans Gaslight Co., 27 La. 
Ann. 138, 147 (1875)). 
42 Id. at 670. 
43 Id. at 672. 
44 Id. at 673. 
45 New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 458 
(1905). 
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power, “in so far as its exercise is essential to the health of the 
community, . . . cannot be contracted away.”46  As the Court put it 
[i]t would be unreasonable to suppose that in the grant 
to the gas company of the right to use the streets in the 
laying of its pipes it was ever intended to surrender or 
impair the public right to discharge the duty of 
conserving the public health.  The gas company did not 
acquire any specific location in the streets; it was content 
with the general right to use them; and when it located 
its pipes it was at the risk that they might be, at some 
future time, disturbed, when the state might require for 
a necessary public use that changes in location be 
made.47 
This paramount public right, moreover, extended beyond the surface 
of the streets to the ground below because the public needed systems for 
supplying water and light and removing sewage and storm-water.  
Furthermore, “every reason of public policy requires that grants of rights 
in [the] subsurface shall be held subject to such reasonable regulation as 
the public health and safety may require.”48  Thus, “whatever right the 
gas company acquired was subject, in so far as the location of its pipes 
was concerned, to such future regulations as might be required in the 
interest of the public health and welfare.”49  This view of the company’s 
right, from the Supreme Court’s perspective, was “amply sustained by 
the authorities.”50 
In other words, “[t]he gas company, by its grant from the city, 
acquired no exclusive right to the location of its pipes in the streets, as 
chosen by it, under a general grant of authority to use the streets.”51  So 
the drainage commission’s relocation order was not a taking of property; 
rather, it was an exercise of the police power, and the expense the 
company incurred gave no basis for a legal claim.  The company had to 
move its pipes to accommodate the drainage commission’s new public 
work, and “[i]n complying with this requirement at its own expense, 
                                                 
46 Id. at 460. 
47 Id. at 461. 
48 Id. 
49  Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 462. 
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none of the property of the gas company has been taken, and the injury 
sustained is damnum absque injuria.”52 
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court adhered to the 
position it marked off in New Orleans Gaslight, distinguishing a utility’s 
property right in its franchise from the permissive use of any given 
location in the street.  Thus, it was improper for the city of Louisville, in 
a dispute over quality of a telephone company’s service, to repeal the 
ordinance authorizing the company to install its lines in the streets, for 
that would destroy the company’s franchise.53  Conversely, it would be a 
proper exercise of the police power for a city to compel a railroad 
company to move its tracks from one part of the street to another, 
because “the franchise, and not the particular location, [is] the essence of 
the contract” and though a franchise may not be destroyed under color 
of the police power, its use may be regulated in the public interest.54 
C. Utility Relocations and the Growth of the Highway Network 
1. Highway Expansion Before World War II 
The number of automobiles in use in the United States increased 
from four experimental vehicles in 1895 to 55,290 cars and trucks in 
1904.55  By 1910, the number of registered motor vehicles increased to 
468,500, and by 1920, it jumped to 9,239,161.56  Between 1915 and 1925, 
automobile ownership went from one car per every sixty families to one 
car per eight families.57 
This increased use of automobiles brought with it an increased 
demand for better roads and more involvement by the federal 
government in the highway building process.  In 1916, a federal highway 
law was enacted that “provided substantial road funding to all States 
                                                 
52 Id.  The Latin phrase means “[l]oss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense,” in 
other words, “[a] loss or injury which does not give rise to an action for damages against 
the person causing it.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990). 
53 City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649, 652, 663–64 (1912). 
54 Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 553 (1913).  Notably, 
Justice Lamar was the author of both the Grand Trunk and the Cumberland opinion.  
Although the Supreme Court of this era was famously protective of contract rights, it 
nonetheless recognized that the police power could not be contracted away and that even 
major changes, such as the raising or lowering of a track, could be required. “[T]he 
municipality had ample authority to make regulations necessitating changes of a nature 
which could not have been compelled if the grant had been from it as a private proprietor.”  
Id. 
55 Spencer Miller, Jr., History of the Modern Highway in the United States, in HIGHWAYS IN 
OUR NATIONAL LIFE 88, 95 (1950). 
56 Id. 
57 See SCHEWE, supra note 24, at 78. 
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with highway departments.  States without highway departments 
quickly formed them.”58  This legislation was followed in 1921 by an act 
creating a primary road system consisting of seven percent of the rural 
highways in each State, which were eligible for federal-aid funding.59  
Federal-aid was confined to highway construction in rural areas; 
therefore, these projects “generally had little or no effect on existing 
utility facilities.”60 
When the New York legislature decided in 1936 to authorize 
construction of a tunnel from Queens to midtown Manhattan, it elected 
to create a Tunnel Authority to build the project with toll-financed 
bonds61 because federal highway funds could not be used to build roads 
in cities.62  Consolidated Edison spent over $535,000 to comply with the 
Tunnel Authority’s order to relocate its facilities in public streets near the 
tunnel approaches and then sued to recover the cost.  Arguing that the 
tunnel was not really a governmental function but a proprietary one, 
where the Tunnel Authority was competing in a realm traditionally 
occupied by private enterprise, Edison convinced a lower appeals court 
that the Tunnel Authority should bear the relocation costs.63 
This argument had some force to it, for since colonial days public 
improvement projects traditionally were “carried out by private 
companies or individuals designated by governments to serve the public 
interest.”64  Toll roads and toll bridges, built and operated by private 
companies under government charter, were a common feature of the 
American landscape.65  As time went by, however, governments began 
providing services such as water, sewer, electricity, and public 
transportation, and the line between governmental and non-
governmental functions became ever more indistinct.66 
To the New York Court of Appeals, it was not a close case; the 
Authority was an agent of the State and the tunnel project was clearly a 
                                                 
58 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., PUBLICATION NO. FHWA-SA-93-049, 
HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE 6 (1993) [hereinafter HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE]. 
59 Id. 
60 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., UTILITY RELOCATION AND 
ACCOMMODATION:  A HISTORY OF FEDERAL POLICY UNDER THE FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY 
PROGRAM 2 (1980) [hereinafter UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION]. 
61 N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth. v. Consol. Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 472, 476 (1946). 
62 See HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that federal-aid highway 
funds could not be spent for construction inside cities with a population of 2500 or more). 
63 N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth., 295 N.Y. at 473. 
64 ANDREW R.L. CAYTON, OHIO:  THE HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 49 (2002). 
65 See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (toll bridge); Custiss v. 
Georgetown & Alexandria Tpk. Co., 10 U.S. 233 (1810) (toll road). 
66 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring). 
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public highway improvement.67  The mere fact that a toll was charged 
did not make the tunnel a business enterprise.  Instead, the imposition of 
tolls created “a new class of taxpayers thought to be more justly charged 
with the cost of the new improvement.”68  Accordingly, the court saw no 
reason to depart from its then eighty-three year-old Deering precedent, 
reiterating that the “‘fundamental common law right applicable to 
franchises in streets’ is that a utility company must relocate its 
facilities . . . when changes are required by public necessity.”69 
2. The 1944 Highway Act and Urban Expressways  
Remarkably, despite economic depression and war, traffic volume 
and the weight and speed of vehicles continued to increase throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s.70  By 1941, some 34,472,000 motor vehicles were 
registered in the United States.71  Responding to this growth, the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1944 significantly increased the amount of federal 
highway funds to be used for the federal-aid primary system (including 
the newly authorized National System of Interstate Highways); 
authorized the creation of a federally-aided system of secondary 
highways; and for the first time allowed these highway systems to be 
extended into cities.72 
This significant expansion of the federal-aid highway system 
increased the number and size of utility relocations, which led the 
Federal Public Roads Administration to issue its first comprehensive 
policy on using federal funds to pay for that work.73  Because utilities 
occupy public rights-of-way pursuant to state law, the Administration 
decided to leave it up to the states to determine if a utility had a right to 
                                                 
67 N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth., 295 N.Y. at 475–76. 
68 Id. at 476. 
69 Id. at 474–75.  The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar result when asked to 
determine whether the Chicago subway system was “governmental” or “proprietary.”  
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of Chicago, 109 N.E.2d 777 (Ill. 1952).  The court 
concluded that providing ways for travel below the surface of the streets was a proper 
street use and that the same rules governing use of the surface applied below ground:  
“[t]he rights of the public remain paramount, and other owners, including utilities, 
occupying such subsurface space do so subject to those rights.”  Id. at 784.  Citing New 
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453 (1905), the Illinois 
court came to the same conclusion:  under the franchise agreement the gas company was 
“subject at all times to the resolutions and ordinances of the common council of the city of 
Chicago” and “[i]t had no vested right to have its facilities remain where they were.”  
Peoples Gas Light, 109 N.E.2d. at 786. 
70 HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE, supra note 58, at 6. 
71 Miller, Jr., supra note 55, at 96. 
72 UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 2. 
73 Id. at 2–3. 
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be reimbursed for relocation costs.  In its 1946 policy memorandum, the 
Administration required each state to “make a formal finding as to the 
extent that such utility company is obligated, or is relieved of the 
obligation, by law or otherwise to move or to change its facilities at its 
own expense.”74 
Under this federal policy, the state first had to look to its statutes and 
applicable franchise agreements or other contracts.  If one of those 
documents specifically reserved to the government the power to require 
a utility to move at its own expense, then it would have to exercise that 
power for the project to receive federal funding.75 
If the relocation-cost issue was not specifically addressed by statute 
or agreement, then federal highway policy indicated the state’s common 
law rule would govern.  Only if the common law did not require the 
utility to pay its own relocation costs did the federal policy allow 
reimbursement, and then only to the state government for “the cost of 
such work actually paid by the State or its subdivisions.”76 
Working within this framework, the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
and Southern Bell Telephone submitted to the court a set of agreed facts 
about a new urban freeway in Louisville:  the Watterson Expressway.77  
Southern Bell contended that Kentucky should pay its relocation costs.  
Its 1886 state-wide franchise required the company to construct and 
maintain its lines and poles “so as not to obstruct” the highways and 
streets, and Southern Bell argued that it fulfilled this requirement by 
properly locating its facilities when they were originally installed.78 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals disagreed.  In its 1954 decision, the 
court reasoned that if Southern Bell’s interpretation of its franchise was 
correct, then the state would have been required to design its highways 
to avoid the company’s facilities rather than for the safety and 
convenience of the traveling public.79  To the court, this result made no 
sense, especially because state-paid relocation would amount to an 
unconstitutional grant of the state’s credit to a corporation: accordingly, 
the “not to obstruct” requirement must relate to new or improved 
highways as well as completed ones.80 
                                                 
74 FED. WORKS AGENCY, U.S. PUB. RDS. ADMIN., GEN. ADMIN. MEMO. NO. 300, 
REIMBURSEMENT OF COSTS OF CHANGES TO UTIL. FACILITIES, P-3819 (1946) (reprinted in 
UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 3). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.2d 308, 309–10 (Ky. 1954). 
78 Id. at 310. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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Express language aside, the court determined that Southern Bell’s 
franchise necessarily included an implied duty to relocate.  Citing New 
York City Tunnel Authority and its own 1871 Louisville City Railway 
decision, the court stated, “we think there is a clearly implied condition 
that [Southern Bell] may be required to remove and relocate its facilities 
when such removal and relocation are in the interest of public 
convenience or safety.”81 
3. Highway Legislation During the 1950s  
Utility companies continued to press Congress for action, and 
extensive hearings were held in connection with the 1952 and 1954 
Federal-Aid Highway Acts.82  After the 1954 hearings, however, the 
Senate Committee on Public Works expressed reluctance to alter the 
existing common law pattern.  Instead, it “tentatively concluded that, 
since the question was governed by long-established state law, it was 
‘neither feasible nor desirable for the Federal Government to give 
direction to those local relationships by force of application of Federal 
funds.’”83  
The utilities also lobbied the states.  In 1955, for example, the Maine 
legislature enacted a statute requiring the Maine Turnpike Authority to 
pay to acquire or relocate utilities on parts of the Turnpike that were 
then under construction.84  But a group of bondholders sued to 
invalidate the statute, arguing that it unlawfully changed the terms of 
the Turnpike bonds they had purchased in 1953.85 
Before reaching that argument, however, the Maine Supreme Court 
had to determine whether funds could have been used for that purpose 
under the original bonding arrangement.  After a thorough review, it 
agreed that “[t]he ‘fundamental common law right applicable to 
franchises in streets’ is that a utility company must relocate its facilities 
in the public streets when changes are required by public necessities.”86  
As the Maine court explained: 
[c]harters, franchises, statutory grants and permits 
affording the use of public ways to utility locations are 
                                                 
81 Id. at 310–11. 
82 UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 4. 
83 Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 
30, 39 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1093, at 13 (1954)). 
84 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 136 A.2d 699, 717 (Me. 1957). 
85 Id. at 717–22. 
86 Id. at 710 (quoting N.Y.C. Tunnel Auth. v. Consol. Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 474 
(1946)). 
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subservient, expressly or by implication, in the exercise 
of governmental functions, to public travel and to the 
paramount police power and relocation of utility 
facilities in public streets or ways are at utility expense, a 
common law liability unless abrogated by the clear 
import of the language used in a particular instance.87 
The court then considered Turnpike Authority’s powers: 
Because of the state of the law authoritatively expressed, 
without an affirmative grant from the legislature, the 
defendant utilities when submitting to the police power 
had no right to reimbursement for relocation of their 
facilities installed in the public ways or for abandonment 
of them.  Conversely the Authority had no right to 
reimburse the utilities without such legislative 
sanction.88 
Turning to the Authority’s enabling act, the court concluded that it 
neither stated nor implied that the Authority may or must pay utility 
relocation costs.89 
Having determined that the common law rule prohibited the 
Turnpike Authority from paying relocation costs, and having found that 
the Authority’s enabling act did not change this rule, the court then 
considered the 1955 amendment to the enabling act.  That amendment, 
the court determined, was unconstitutional because payment of the 
utilities’ relocation costs “could be made only by diversion from 
moneys” that had been pledged to pay off the bonds.90 
In 1956, while the Maine litigation was still ongoing, Congress 
enacted section 111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act.  That statute, now 
codified at 23 U.S.C. § 123, was patterned on the existing practice of 
reimbursing the States for money lawfully spent on utility relocation.  As 
a House committee report explained, that practice was being authorized 
by statute “in order that there [would] be no question of the propriety of 
so using Federal funds where a State under its own laws or practices 
pays such costs on Federal-aid highway projects.”91  But as the report 
was careful to point out, “[t]here is no requirement in this section, either 
                                                 
87 Id. at 711. 
88 Id. at 715. 
89 Id. at 716. 
90 Id. at 720. 
91 UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 60, at 5 (quoting H.R. REP. 
No. 84-2022 (1956)). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/2
2011] Moving the Lines 473 
expressed or implied, that a State must pay all or any part of utility 
relocation costs.”92 
In addition, section 111 got rid of the requirement that states make 
formal findings about how their existing laws would affect utilities 
relocating from public rights-of-way.  Instead, it stated that whenever a 
state paid to relocate utilities for a federal-aid highway project, federal 
funds could be used to reimburse it, unless “the payment to the utility 
violates the law of the State or violates a legal contract between the 
utility and the State.”93 
This new provision resulted in a cascade of state legislation designed 
to obtain federal dollars for utility relocation.  Before passage of the 1956 
act, only eight states had statutes authorizing payment of utility 
relocation costs under certain circumstances.94  During 1956 and 1957, 
however, bills providing for payment of relocation costs were introduced 
in forty states, although only sixteen actually became law.95  
Significantly, only one of these new laws authorized payment of 
relocation costs on all state-maintained highways regardless of federal 
funding.96  Five states limited reimbursement to federal-aid highway 
projects, and the remaining ten limited it to projects on the Interstate 
System, where federal reimbursement was at least ninety percent of the 
total cost.97 
In a 1958 report, “[t]he Senate Committee on Public Works expressed 
concern over ‘this drastic change in existing practices,’ noting that ‘the 
use of Federal funds for reimbursement to the States for this purpose will 
increase substantially, thereby reducing the amount of Federal funds 
available for construction of highways.’”98  The Committee considered 
capping the funds available to states for reimbursement for utility 
relocations, but the final bill backed away from this limitation, instead 
providing that “reimbursement be made ‘only after evidence satisfactory 
to the Secretary [of Commerce] shall have been presented to him 
substantiating the fact that the State has paid such cost from its own 
funds.’”99 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 6 (quoting Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 111, 70 Stat. 383 
(1956)). 
94 Id. at 8.  The states were California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Missouri, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont.  Id. 
95 Id. at 6. 
96 Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 
30, 40 n.17 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1407, at 28 (1958)). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 40 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-1407, at 28 (1958)). 
99 Id. (quoting Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-381, 72 Stat. 94-95 (1958)). 
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So after a decade of study and deliberation, “the relations between 
utilities and the States were left, once again, to state law.  No federal right 
to reimbursement was ever granted to utilities, although pro rata federal 
reimbursement remained available to the States if state law required 
reimbursement of utilities.”100 
D. The Uniform Relocation Act and the 1983 Norfolk Redevelopment 
Decision 
The continued expansion of federally funded highways in urban 
areas, together with the development of federal housing and urban 
renewal projects, led to an increasing number of people and businesses 
that had to relocate, sometimes with little if any assistance.101  
Responding to this problem, Congress passed the Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, commonly 
called the Uniform Relocation Act.102  This legislation applied to federal 
agencies only, but state agencies had to provide equivalent relocation 
assistance to qualify for federal funding, so many states adopted 
legislation modeled on the Federal Act.103 
Since the Act provided relocation assistance to displaced businesses 
and included reimbursement of expenses in moving business property, 
utilities began to seek payment for relocating their facilities from public 
rights-of-way.104  When federally assisted highway projects were 
involved, some courts held that specific utility relocation provisions of 
the 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act prevailed over the general relocation 
assistance statutes.105  For other types of projects, most courts held that 
the common law rule still took precedence because the broad general 
                                                 
100 Id.  States stood to lose out if they erred in deciding whether state law required 
reimbursement.  Arizona v. United States, 494 F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (Ct. Cl. 1974).  When 
Arizona built an interstate highway through the Kaibab National Forest, it displaced a 
natural gas pipeline that was installed pursuant to a terminable license from the U.S. Forest 
Service.  Id. at 1285.  The Federal Highway Administration had previously approved 
Arizona’s utility agreement with the pipeline company, in which the state undertook to 
pay for the relocation.  Id. at 1286.  But the government later denied Arizona’s claim for 
reimbursement, contending that under 23 U.S.C. § 123 the state had no legal obligation to 
pay relocation costs.  Id. at 1287.  The Federal Court of Claims disagreed, noting that 
although the Forest Service had the power to terminate the license and thereby cause the 
pipeline company to remove its equipment for free, Arizona did not.  Id. at 1288. 
101 Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 36–37. 
102 Id. at 32, 36–37. 
103 Id. at 32. 
104 Id. at 34–35. 
105 See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. State of Del., Dep’t of Highways & Transp., 330 A.2d 
432, 439 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974). 
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definitions used in the relocation assistance statutes were not specific 
enough to abrogate it.106 
Other courts, however, believed that the federal and state relocation 
assistance statutes signaled a shift away from the common law “utility 
pays” rule.  Arkansas, which had already limited the scope of its 
common law rule to take advantage of federal reimbursement, truncated 
it still further.107  And the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
applying the Uniform Relocation Act, found arguments against utility 
relocation payments based on the common law unconvincing, declaring 
that “[t]he Act was intended to create rights that were not recognized at 
common law.”108 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that the common law 
rule still governed.  In its 1983 decision in Norfolk Redevelopment, it 
reversed the Fourth Circuit, unanimously holding that the Uniform 
Relocation Act did not give businesses a new federal right to 
reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating utility lines in public 
streets.109 
The Court started with the common law rule, under which “utilities 
have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public 
right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local 
authorities.”110  This rule had a long pedigree with the Court; it was 
recognized and accepted beginning with New Orleans Gaslight in 1905.111 
Next, the Court invoked “a well-established principle of statutory 
construction” by which “[t]he common law . . . ought not to be deemed 
to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for 
this purpose.”112  This principle had even more weight in the case before 
it, for “the elements of the federal law of eminent domain are largely 
derived from the common law.”113 
After laying this groundwork, the Court then turned to the 
Relocation Act itself, observing that the provisions at issue were 
                                                 
106 See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. v. Costle, 615 F.2d 1147, 1148–50 (6th Cir. 1980); Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Glendale, 87 Cal. App. 3d 296, 299–301 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1978); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Boise Redevelopment Agency, 607 P.2d 
1084, 1088–90 (Idaho 1980). 
107 Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Fayetteville, 609 S.W.2d 914, 916–18 (Ark. 1980).  One 
justice thought the decision discarded the common law rule and should not have.  Id. at 
918–19 (Stroud, J., dissenting). 
108 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Landrieu, 674 F.2d 298, 300 (4th Cir. 1982). 
109 Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 33, 43. 
110 Id. at 35. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 35–36 (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, 623 (1813)) 
(alteration and omission in original). 
113 Id. at 36. 
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modeled after the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway Act.114  Critically, however, 
the utility’s reimbursement claims under the Relocation Act “would not 
have been countenanced under the 1968 Highway Act.  Utility relocation 
costs necessitated by federally funded highway projects were already 
specifically governed by a separate provision, 23 U.S.C. § 123, which 
predated and was left intact by the 1968 Act.”115  That earlier law, 
adopted as section 111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, was the 
product of much legislative consideration, and it did not create any 
federal right to reimbursement of utility relocation costs.116  Instead, it 
allowed pro rata federal reimbursement “to the States if state law 
required reimbursement of utilities.”117 
Subsequent federal highway legislation, including the model 1968 
Act that first provided for relocation assistance to displaced persons, did 
nothing to change the utility-relocation policy embodied in 23 U.S.C. 
§ 123.  This history, in the Court’s view, showed “that Congress 
considered utility relocation costs and the expenses incurred by 
‘displaced persons’ to be separate and distinct problems calling for 
separate and distinct solutions.”118  Thus, “Congress showed that it was 
aware of the common law rule that utilities must bear their own 
relocation expenses, and it proved unwilling, after extensive 
consideration and debate, to federalize the relations between utilities and 
state and local governments.”119 
Significantly, too, the Relocation Act repealed sections of prior law 
that had been superseded but left 23 U.S.C. § 123 intact.  This fact 
confirmed to the Court that Congress did not intend to change existing 
law with regard to utilities.  The highway-related utility reimbursement 
statute “was neither contradicted nor rendered superfluous because it 
addressed a problem outside the scope of the Relocation Act.”120 
Finally, the Court returned to the common law, noting that “Virginia 
has continuously recognized the common law rule that a utility forced to 
relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense.”121  
Notably, too, the utility company “has always in the past borne all costs 
of relocation and has included those expenses as part of its operating 
expenses within the rate structure approved by the State Corporation 
                                                 
114 Id. at 37. 
115 Id. at 38. 
116 Id. at 39–40. 
117 Id. at 40. 
118 Id. at 41. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 42. 
121 Id. (citing Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Fugate, 180 S.E.2d 657, 658–59 (Va. 1971)). 
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Commission.”122  These established practices underscored the Court’s 
conclusion that the Relocation Act “did not grant utilities . . . a new, 
federal right to reimbursement for expenses of the sort incurred here.”123 
E. Consideration of the Developed Common Law Rule 
The common law rule requiring utilities using a public right-of-way 
to pay for their own relocation, upon request by the governmental 
authority responsible for the road, developed along with the growth of 
the utilities themselves.  It is important to note that this rule applies only 
to utilities in a public right-of-way.  If the utility had obtained its own 
easement, and a public project required relocation from that private right-
of-way, the government would pay to move or accommodate the 
facilities.124 
But if the utility chose to use an existing public right-of-way to avoid 
the time and expense of acquiring its own,125 then it must accept the risk 
                                                 
122 Id. at 42-43. 
123 Id. at 43.  In 1987, Congress enacted the Surface Transportation and Uniform 
Relocation Assistance Act (“STURAA”).  OFFICE OF PROGRAM ADMIN., FED. HIGHWAY 
ADMIN., PROGRAM GUIDE: UTILITY RELOCATION AND ACCOMMODATION ON FEDERAL-AID 
HIGHWAY PROJECTS, B-14 (6th ed. 2003), available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/ 
utilguid/if03014.pdf.  Section 405 of that Act amended the Relocation Act to allow for 
payment of certain utility relocation expenses for facilities located on public property.  
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 
101 Stat. 132, 249–51 (1987).  This amendment, however, was limited to utility relocations 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by Federal law.”  Id.  According to the Federal Highway 
Administration, the “otherwise provided” exception means that 23 U.S.C. § 123 is still 
controlling for federal-aid highways.  Id. 
124 See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 623 
(1935) (involving a gas transmission line within its own private right-of-way); City of 
Grand Prairie v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 405 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that the 
common law rule does not apply to telephone facilities “located in a private easement 
acquired long prior to the planning, laying out and construction of the street”); Tennessee 
v. United States, 256 F.2d 244, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1958) (explaining that government 
reimbursement is required for relocation of thiry-eight utility poles installed on private 
land, and there is no reimbursement for five poles installed within county road right-of-
way).  But see Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Outagamie Cnty., 752 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2008) (enforcing ordinance requiring utility that was replaced within zoning setback to pay 
for relocation, even though the utility had its own easement). 
 Safety concerns might mean the utility had to pay for relocation, even if it had its own 
easement.  As the Panhandle Eastern Court noted, an existing utility will be required to 
accommodate a new road at its own cost if its operation poses a danger to the public.  
Panhandle E., 294 U.S. at 619, 622; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 
394, 409–12 (1921).  In Panhandle Eastern, there was no safety issue; the state highway 
commission had to pay for the accommodation because the buried gas line posed no 
danger to traffic on the road.  Panhandle E., 294 U.S. at 619. 
125 The acquisition of a right-of-way can be quite costly.  By way of illustration, Federal 
Highway Administration data showed that during 2005 states spent over $1,750,000,000 to 
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that it might be required to relocate its facilities for some other public 
use.  As the New York Court of Appeals summarized it:  “the company 
took the risk of their location and should be required to make such 
changes as public convenience or security requires, and at its own cost 
and charge.”126 
The other possibility—requiring the government to pay for 
relocation when the public right-of-way is needed for some other 
purpose—would have been unworkable for several reasons.  First, as the 
Ohio Supreme Court noted in its 1893 Columbus Gaslight & Coke decision, 
street improvements would become impossibly expensive if each utility 
using the right-of-way had to be compensated for the changes made to 
its lines.127 
Second, governments need to respond to changed conditions.  
Although a utility line might have been unobtrusive when first installed, 
it could become an obstruction with changes in the use of the right-of-
way.  As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized in 1905, 
“[a] location not inconvenient when made, may become so because of 
changed conditions; and whether it has or not, must be ascertained by 
the commissioners in office when the inquiry is made.  No board has 
power to determine for all time just how a highway shall be used.”128  If 
the public had to pay for relocation, it would impede the government’s 
ability to respond to new conditions by modifying how the public right-
of-way is used. 
Third, the need for flexibility is so important that, even if some short-
sighted or improperly influenced governmental body did purport to 
“determine for all time” how the public right-of-way would be used, 
courts will not allow it.  So, for example, although a city government 
might agree to let a street railway company lay rails in the public ways, it 
cannot contract away its power to change the pavement on those streets 
or “embarrass or clog its right to exercise such power by undertaking, 
either expressly or by implication, to pay the expenses necessarily 
incurred by the company in complying with the reasonable and proper 
regulations made by the city upon this subject.”129 
                                                                                                             
acquire right-of-way for highway projects.  NAT’L COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, TRANSP. RES. BD., NCHRP REP. No. 625, PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR RIGHT-OF-WAY 
COST ESTIMATION AND COST MANAGEMENT 7 (2009). 
126 In re Deering, 93 N.Y. 361, 362 (1883). 
127 Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 33 N.E. 292, 294 (Ohio 1893). 
128 Ganz v. Ohio Postal Tel. Cable Co., 140 F. 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1905). 
129 Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of Louisville, 71 Ky. 415, 422 (Ky. Ct. App. 1871).  As 
noted above, a utility company might have long-term franchise rights that could not be 
abrogated by the government without payment of just compensation, but courts 
distinguish between the franchise to use the streets and the particular location of the 
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Fourth, allowing a utility to have preemptive rights in the location of 
its facilities within the public right-of-way contradicts the very concept 
of a street or highway.  One nineteenth century Texas appellate decision 
aptly described it as follows: 
the fundamental idea of a street is that it is 
public. . . . [T]hough private persons and corporations 
are permitted to lay street-railway tracks, water, gas, 
and steam pipes, as well as electric wires, in the streets, 
because they so far contribute to the convenience and 
accommodation of the public as to acquire a quasi public 
character, yet these secondary, quasi public uses of the 
street are, and of necessity must be, subordinate to the 
other strictly public and primary uses of the street, and, 
with a view to maintaining that subordination, a license 
must be obtained from the municipal authorities (the 
custodians of the street) before any such special and 
quasi public use can be made of the street; and such 
licensees can acquire no rights which are inconsistent 
with this subordination.130 
As courts have often observed, however, “[t]he strength and genius 
of the common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the 
society it governs.”131  Not surprisingly, utilities have continued to urge 
courts to limit or adapt the common law rule to better conform to their 
interests.  In the next section of this Article, we will examine those 
arguments. 
II.  EFFORTS TO AVOID THE COMMON LAW RULE 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 Norfolk Redevelopment decision 
affirming the common law rule, utilities have marshaled a number of 
different arguments in an effort to avoid it.  Those arguments fall into 
several broad categories. 
First, utilities argue that the project by which the utility is being 
displaced is not “governmental” but “proprietary”—in other words, an 
entry by the government into an area traditionally occupied by private 
enterprise.  Second, they contend that because the utility’s rates are 
regulated by a specialized state agency and relocation costs affect rates, 
                                                                                                             
company’s facilities in the streets, which can be changed by government order.  Grand 
Trunk W. Ry. Co. v. City of South Bend, 227 U.S. 544, 553 (1913). 
130 City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St. Ry. Co., 39 S.W. 136, 138 (Tex. App. 1896). 
131 Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972). 
Stokes: Moving the Lines: The Common Law of Utility Relocation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
480 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
the common law has been abrogated.  Third, utilities also argue that the 
utility’s franchise statute or some other statute has preempted or 
supplanted the common law rule.  Fourth, utilities assert that there has 
been a “taking.” 
There is a fifth category, too, in which utilities contend that the 
governmental action is being undertaken largely to benefit some private 
entity, such as a developer.  Because this category of cases raises some 
unique and complex issues, it is treated in a section of its own. 
A. Governmental/Proprietary Activity Cases 
The idea of drawing a distinction between government activities 
undertaken in a truly governmental capacity, as opposed to 
“proprietary” activities, originated in tort law, where actions deemed to 
be proprietary would not be shielded by sovereign immunity.132  In one 
early case, for example, a court determined that when the city of New 
York, acting pursuant to state legislation, built a dam on the Croton 
River to supply clean drinking water to its residents, it was not immune 
from liability for the resulting flooding because such dam-building was 
typically done by private companies.133  The court reasoned that because 
the activity was a proprietary one, the city stood “on the same footing as 
would any individual or body of persons upon whom the like special 
franchises had been conferred.”134 
Even at that early date, however, the court confessed that the line 
was hard to draw.  For example, the Chief Judge explained, “there is 
some difficulty, I admit, in separating them in the mind, and properly 
distinguishing the one class from the other . . . [b]ut the distinction is 
quite clear and well settled, and the process of separation practicable.”135  
Later, this distinction was adopted in other legal contexts, where it 
proved to be equally difficult to apply.136  Like Justice Stewart’s famous 
“I know it when I see it” test for obscenity,137 however, the 
governmental/proprietary distinction has persisted.  Yet modern courts 
have rejected it in utility relocation cases. 
In Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland,138 for example, a 
group of utility companies argued that Portland had no legal authority 
                                                 
132 City & Cnty. of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Colo. 
1988). 
133 Bailey v. Mayor of N.Y.C., 3 Hill 531, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 City & Cnty. of Denver, 754 P.2d at 1174–75. 
137 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
138 711 P.2d 119 (Or. 1985). 
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to compel them to relocate their facilities to accommodate construction of 
a light rail transit system.139  The utilities “strenuously” urged that mass 
transit was a proprietary function, and that by entering this field the city 
put itself on the same footing as any other public utility—meaning that it 
was not entitled to cost-free relocation.140 
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, found the purported 
distinction to be useless.  First, while some courts said that 
“governmental” functions were those that are essential or necessary for 
the government to perform (evidently in contrast to functions that are 
optional luxuries), no court had ever found a governmental act that 
failed this test.141  Second, other courts considered “governmental” 
functions to be those that are traditional for the government to perform, 
but changes in the economy and new public demands “change which 
activities are traditionally and customarily engaged in by 
government.”142  These weaknesses led the Oregon court to reject the 
governmental/proprietary distinction, concluding that it was 
“unworkable, untenable and unhelpful in deciding mass transit/utility 
relocation cases.”143 
The Colorado Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in its 
1988 City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Co. decision, which dealt with telephone lines under a city street that 
were displaced by a sanitary sewer.144  Because the sewer benefited a 
newly annexed subdivision and Denver had agreed to bear the cost of 
installing it despite municipal regulations to the contrary, the phone 
company argued that Denver was acting in a proprietary capacity and 
should pay for the relocation.145  The lower appellate court was 
persuaded by this argument,146 but the state’s high court was not, 
concluding that the governmental/proprietary distinction was 
“analytically unsound because it assumes that functions which were 
once relegated to the private sector could not later be undertaken by 
municipalities in support of the health, safety and welfare of its 
citizens.”147  Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that “the 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 690 P.2d 1099, 1103–05 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 
141 Nw. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 711 P.2d 119, 125 (Or. 1985). 
142 Id. at 126. 
143 Id. 
144 754 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Colo. 1988). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1175. 
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governmental/proprietary distinction has no continuing validity in the 
context of utilities relocation law.”148 
Consideration of the principal opinion on which the utilities relied 
shows why the governmental/proprietary distinction is unsound.  In 
1917, the city of Los Angeles decided to begin lighting its own streets.  
Instead of just putting up its own street-lights, it decided to “clear a 
‘space’” by ordering the incumbent franchisee to move its lights to other 
locations.149  As it happened, the value of the franchisee’s right to light 
the streets during the remaining term of the franchise was about $4000 
while the cost to relocate its equipment exceeded $50,000.150  Since the 
city was not attempting to revoke the franchise outright, its action 
arguably came within the scope of the police power. 151  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court noted, however, the federal district court could not find 
any reason to exercise that power.  The Court opined 
[i]n what way the public peace or health or safety was 
imperiled by the lighting system of the corporation or 
relieved by its removal or change, the court was unable 
to see and it is certainly not apparent.  The court pointed 
out that there were several lighting systems in existence 
and occupying the streets and that there was no contest, 
or disorder or overcharge of rates or peril, or defect of 
any kind, and therefore concluded that the conditions 
demonstrated that while the city might install its own 
system there was no real “public necessity” arising from 
consideration of public health, peace or safety requiring 
the city to engage in the business of furnishing light.152  
The Supreme Court also noted that the proper scope of the police 
power “may be exceeded and so far as wrongful be restrained.”153  Well-
established law already gave courts the power to stop arbitrary or 
unreasonable acts by the government.154  Thus, whether Los Angeles’s 
                                                 
148 Id. at 1176. 
149 City of Los Angeles v. L.A. Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 37 (1919). 
150 Id. 
151 Compare id. at 36 (stating that the ordinance did not attempt “absolute displacement” 
of the franchised utility), with City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649, 
663–64 (1912) (noting that the ordinance in question effectively revoked the utility’s 
franchise). 
152 City of Los Angeles, 251 U.S. at 38. 
153 Id. 
154 E.g., Atl. Coast Line. R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 559 (1914).  In Atlantic Coast 
Line, the Supreme Court stated the following: 
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entry into the field of street-lighting was “proprietary” or 
“governmental” added nothing to the analysis.  Even if the act was 
governmental, using the police power to muscle a franchisee out of the 
way, absent any demonstrable public necessity, was an unreasonable act 
that could be enjoined. 
And that is exactly the conclusion reached by the Colorado Supreme 
Court.155  Instead of struggling to decide whether a particular public 
improvement was “governmental” (and therefore properly supported by 
use of the police power) or “proprietary” (meaning the government 
should stand on the same footing as a private actor), the court decided 
the proper test was one of reasonableness.156  Accordingly, it held that “a 
municipality may compel public utilities to relocate their facilities from 
the public right-of-way whenever such relocation is necessitated by the 
municipality’s reasonable exercise of police power to regulate the health, 
safety, or welfare of its citizens.”157 
B. “Regulated Utility” Cases 
Since utility service in any particular area tends, by virtue of its 
costly infrastructure, to be monopolistic in nature, utility companies 
have long been subject to public regulation.158  Typically utilities obtain 
approval of their rates, terms of service, and other business practices 
through tariffs filed with the state regulatory agency.  These documents 
are massive,159 and the level of detail can be exacting.  In 1916, for 
                                                                                                             
[I]f it appear[s] that the regulation under criticism is not in any way 
designed to promote the health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the 
community, or that the means employed have no real and substantial 
relation to the avowed or ostensible purpose, or that there is wanton or 
arbitrary interference with private rights, the question arises whether 
the law-making body has exceeded the legitimate bounds of the police 
power. 
Id.  Moreover, in National Water-Works Co. v. City of Kansas, the Western District of Missouri 
stated that “it may be that any malicious or unreasonable action by the city in the exercise 
of the right to construct sewers . . . may be the foundation of a claim for damages.”  28 F. 
921, 922 (W.D. Mo. 1886). 
155 City & Cnty. of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 754 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Colo. 
1988). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
158 See SCHEWE, supra note 24, at 69 (stating that in 1898, Samuel Insull, the head of 
Chicago Edison and recently-elected president of the National Electric Light Association, 
advocated public regulation of privately-owned utilities precisely because utilities tended 
to operate as monopolies). 
159 See DUKE ENERGY OHIO, P.U.C.O. NO. 19:  SCHEDULE OF RATES, CLASSIFICATIONS RULES 
AND REGULATIONS FOR RETAIL ELECTRIC SERVICE OF DUKE ENERGY OHIO, 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/emplibrary/files/docketing/tariffs/Electric/Duke%20Energy
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example, the Michigan Public Service Commission approved a tariff filed 
by the Detroit Edison Company that included a company program of 
supplying free replacement light bulbs to its customers.160  Because this 
program was part of an approved tariff, the company could not 
discontinue it before filing a new tariff and getting Commission 
approval.161 
Since the cost of relocating utility lines may ultimately affect the 
rates charged to customers, utility companies have argued that their 
approved tariffs must preclude efforts to force them to relocate 
equipment in the public rights-of-way.  In typical relocations, where the 
utility is simply required to move its facilities, the tariff-based argument 
has failed.  But when the government has required the utility, as part of 
the relocation process, to change the design of its facilities from aerial to 
underground lines, the utilities have had somewhat greater success—at 
least in requiring the government to pay the increased expense of 
underground construction. 
1. “Like Kind” Relocations 
A typical example of how a utility tariff might address the relocation 
of facilities came up in a 1997 case involving the Maryland Stadium 
Authority.  Bell Atlantic-Maryland obtained approval of a tariff that 
included the following terms:  “[w]hen the Telephone Company is 
requested to move or change existing construction, the customer or other 
party requiring the move or change is required to pay the entire 
cost . . . attributable to such relocation.”162  The Stadium Authority, 
which was created by state statute to build and expand various public 
venues, ordered Bell Atlantic-Maryland to move its equipment from 
under streets that would be closed to expand Baltimore’s convention 
center.163  Bell Atlantic-Maryland later sued to recover $110,000 in 
relocation costs, claiming that its approved tariff took precedence over 
the common law “utility pays” rule.164 
The court rejected this claim for two reasons.  First, even though the 
Public Service Commission of Maryland had adopted the tariff, it was 
“not the equivalent of the type of legislative act required to alter the 
                                                                                                             
%20Ohio/PUCO%2019,%20Retail.%20Electric%20Tariff.pdf (showing that the Duke 
Energy Ohio filing with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio in 2006 was 259 pages 
long). 
160 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 583 (1976). 
161 Id. at 585. 
162 Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Md. Stadium Auth., 688 A.2d 545, 552 (Md. 1997). 
163 Id. at 547, 550. 
164 Id. at 548, 551–52. 
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common law rule.”165  Second, “even if the Tariff could be considered a 
legislative directive,” its language did not “reverse[] the common law 
rule because it contains no clear language demonstrating that it applies 
to the government.”166 
A similar result occurred in City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp.167  Qwest 
filed a tariff that contained a statement that “[w]hen relocation or aerial 
to underground conversion of existing facilities is requested or required 
by law, the cost of constructing the new and removing the old facilities 
will be borne by the customer or others requesting the relocation or 
conversion.”168  Relying on this language, Qwest refused to relocate its 
facilities, which in one instance resulted in a “telephone pole standing in 
the middle of a newly-widened road.”169 
The State of Washington, however, had a statute that allowed 
telecommunications companies to use public rights-of-way “in such 
manner and at such points as not to incommode the public use of 
the . . . highway.”170  Resolving the case on the narrowest ground, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not have to decide whether the tariff 
had the force of law or whether its ambiguous terms really did purport 
to change the common law rule.  Instead, the appeals court relied on the 
principle that a tariff cannot supersede a statute, holding that “Qwest’s 
tariff did not alter the long-established and unbroken rule established at 
common law and in [the statute] that the utility company must pay 
relocation costs.”171 
2. The Special Problem of “Undergrounding” 
As the Ninth Circuit observed in City of Auburn, city governments 
have been encouraging utilities with overhead lines (such as telephone 
and electricity providers) to locate their facilities underground “for 
aesthetic and safety reasons.”172  Utilities have resisted this trend in their 
tariff filings, contending that underground lines are much more 
expensive and that, if a utility has to bear this cost (and pass it through to 
its customers) then “a customer in one city would be paying more 
because some other city requires underground construction.”173  
                                                 
165 Id. at 552. 
166 Id. 
167 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001). 
168 Id. at 1166. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 1167. 
171 Id. at 1170. 
172 Id. at 1168. 
173 State ex rel. Columbus S. Power Co. v. Fais, 884 N.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ohio 2008). 
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Accordingly, courts have had to decide conflicts between approved 
tariffs, municipal ordinances, and the common law relocation rule.  The 
results have been mixed. 
The city of Longmont, Colorado decided to put its own municipal 
electric lines underground, and in 1993, it enacted an ordinance 
requiring other users of its street utility poles to put their lines 
underground as well.174  U.S. West, however, had an approved tariff 
requiring the customer or “person requesting relocation” to pay for 
undergrounding, and it contended that its tariff had the force of a 
statute, trumping the contrary ordinance.175  The Colorado Supreme 
Court did not agree that the tariff was equivalent to a statute, holding 
that “[o]nly when some future contract, franchise agreement, or state 
statute . . . specifically provides that the municipality must bear the 
financial burden of relocating the facilities does the . . . exception to the 
general common law rule requiring the utility company to pay for 
relocation arise.”176 
The court then went on to decide that the Colorado public utility 
commission’s powers did not preempt municipal power to regulate 
streets and determine when utility relocation is required.177  Finally, the 
court said that although municipalities had to be reasonable in exercising 
their power to order utilities to relocate, a reviewing court would apply a 
presumption of reasonableness—and the facts in this case indicated that 
the city ordinance was reasonable.178 
The New Mexico Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in its 
2003 decision in City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico Public Regulation 
Commission.179  In that case, a group of cities appealed the state utility 
commission’s approval of a tariff allowing a utility to recover costs 
incurred in complying with local undergrounding ordinances.180  In a 
nod to the utility commission, the court remarked that a local 
improvement project based on aesthetics rather than public health and 
safety concerns would “not trigger the common law rule of requiring 
utilities to bear the expense of relocation.”181  Because the tariff applied 
to all undergrounding projects, however, and did not exclude those 
required by the interests of health and safety, the court held that it 
“violate[d] the common law principle of permitting municipalities to 
                                                 
174 U.S. W. Commc’ns., Inc. v. City of Longmont, 948 P.2d 509, 513 (Colo. 1997). 
175 Id. at 514–18. 
176 Id. at 518. 
177 Id. at 520. 
178 Id. at 521–22. 
179 79 P.3d 297 (N.M. 2003). 
180 Id. at 299. 
181 Id. at 301. 
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require the utility to bear its own relocation expenses.”182  As in 
Colorado, the New Mexico court also concluded that because the statute 
creating its state utility commission “specifically provided that 
municipalities and counties have the power to regulate the use of public 
ways” and did not clearly abrogate the common law rule, the 
commission lacked authority to modify it absent a finding of 
unreasonableness.183 
In a recent Michigan case, however, the balance between 
municipalities and the regulatory agency tilted the other way.  Although 
Michigan’s constitution reserves to local governments a power of 
“reasonable control” of highways and streets, this control cannot be 
exercised inconsistently with “general State law.”184  That general body 
of law includes the legislatively-created Michigan Public Service 
Commission (“MPSC”), which has “complete power and jurisdiction to 
regulate all public utilities in the state except . . . as otherwise restricted 
by law.”185  One of the MPSC’s rules requires the utility to bear the cost 
of undergrounding “when required by local ordinances in congested 
areas.”186 
So when the City of Taylor, Michigan enacted an ordinance 
requiring Detroit Edison to relocate its facilities underground during the 
reconstruction of Telegraph Road—a major arterial highway—and the 
utility disclaimed any obligation to pay, the courts had to decide what 
effect to give to the MPSC regulation.  Since local governments had 
constitutional power to regulate streets (except as inconsistent with 
general law) and the MPSC had statutory power to regulate utilities 
(except as restricted by law), the dispute fell into an uncharted area.  Did 
the local governments’ power over streets trump an inconsistent rule by 
the MPSC, or did the MPSC’s power to regulate utilities trump an 
inconsistent city ordinance? 
The lower courts held for the city, reasoning that the state had not 
completely occupied “the field regarding a municipality’s authority over 
the location of power lines, or the allocation of related costs.”187  But the 
                                                 
182 Id. at 304–05. 
183 Id. at 308; see also Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the City of Manitowoc, 
2008 Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *9 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18, 2008) (explaining that 
state utility commission had jurisdiction to review city ordinance that effectively required 
utility to relocate facilities in public street, but the ordinance was presumptively reasonable 
and the burden was on the utility to show otherwise). 
184 MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 28; City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 715 N.W.2d 28, 32–33 
(Mich. 2006) (citing People v. McGraw, 150 N.W. 836, 837 (Mich. 1915)). 
185 City of Taylor, 715 N.W.2d. at 33. 
186 In re City of Taylor, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. U-15234, 2008 Mich PSC 
LEXIS 15, *19. 
187 City of Taylor v. Detroit Edison Co., 689 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Mich. App. 2004). 
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Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding that it was up to the MPSC, 
not the courts, to decide if there was a conflict between the rule and the 
ordinance.  If there was a conflict, the rule would prevail.188 
In the end, the MPSC decided that its rule “entirely supplanted local 
control over undergrounding electrical facilities” and the provision 
allowing for local undergrounding ordinances in congested areas was a 
“narrow exception.”189  It then remanded the matter to the 
administrative law judge for factual findings as to whether the affected 
stretch of road was a congested area within the rule’s meaning.190 
3. The Results of the “Regulated Utility” Cases 
Courts have rejected utilities’ efforts to use their tariffs to shift 
relocation costs to the government in contravention of the longstanding 
common law rule when the relocation is of like kind.  This result makes 
sense.  As noted in Section I.E., when a telephone or electric utility gets 
to use the public right-of-way at little or no cost, the quid pro quo is that 
the utility must move its facilities as required to accommodate other 
public needs.   
In the City of Taylor case, for example, there would have been no 
conflict with MPSC rules had the city required Detroit Edison to replace 
its aerial lines with other aerial lines in a different location to allow for 
widening of the road.  If there were a like-kind relocation order and the 
utility invoked some vaguely-worded tariff to resist it, the outcome 
probably would have paralleled the Ninth Circuit’s City of Auburn 
decision.191  The tariff cannot be ambiguous; it must clearly state that it 
will apply to government-ordered relocation of facilities in the public 
right-of-way.  That clear statement would put everyone on notice that 
the utility meant to change the rules, thereby permitting public debate of 
the issue and an informed decision by the state regulatory agency.  Only 
if the agency approved this clearly disclosed change would a court have 
to decide whether the agency had the power to alter the common or 
statutory law on the subject. 
When the government orders a utility to put aerial wires 
underground, however, a different issue arises.  This order is not just a 
simple relocation—it directs the use of a different (and more expensive) 
kind of facility.  If aerial lines were acceptable before, why are they not 
acceptable now?  The change might be needed for safety reasons, and if 
                                                 
188 City of Taylor, 715 N.W. 2d at 33. 
189 In re City of Taylor, 2008 Mich PSC LEXIS at *19. 
190 Id. at *34. 
191 See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text (discussing the City of Auburn decision). 
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so, it would be within the scope of governmental police power.  But if 
the change is for aesthetic reasons, the governmental agency likely will 
have to pay for it.192 
C. Statutory Abrogation Cases 
Statutes can, of course, displace the common law, but courts 
ordinarily hold that the legislative intent to do so must be clearly 
expressed or necessarily implied.193  Statute-based challenges to the 
common law rule on utility relocation typically come in two forms, 
predicated on either the original franchise statute under which the 
company laid its lines or a statute allowing payment of relocation 
costs.194 
In the first category, Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler is 
representative.195  As it happened, Qwest had telephone facilities on 
public roadways in Arizona pursuant to a territorial statute, enacted in 
1877, that allowed it to build and maintain equipment “from point to 
point, upon and along any of the public roads or highways.”196  Based on 
this statute, Qwest convinced the trial court that its “pre-statehood 
franchise granted it a property right and that it was not required to pay 
its own relocation costs.”197  The appeals court disagreed, for three main 
reasons. 
                                                 
192 This issue is still being litigated in various jurisdictions.  The city of Reynoldsburg, 
Ohio, for example, adopted an ordinance requiring utilities to pay for undergrounding 
their lines as part of a project to revamp its main commercial corridor.  State ex rel. 
Columbus S. Power Co. v. Fais, 884 N.E.2d 1, 1–5 (Ohio 2008).  This ordinance conflicted 
with an approved tariff which specified that if a public authority ordered undergrounding, 
it would have to pay the portion of the cost that exceeded construction of standard 
facilities.  Id.  The city challenged this tariff in court, arguing that its cost-shifting provision 
violated a state statute by being “in excess of that allowed by law.”  Id. at 5.  But the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the utilities commission, not the court, had jurisdiction to decide 
the matter.  Id.  The case is currently pending before Ohio’s utilities commission.  City of 
Reynoldsburg v. Columbus S. Power Co., PUCO, No. 08-0846-EL-CSS, 2008 WL 5069035, at 
*1 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm’n, Nov. 24, 2008). 
193 See, e.g., Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 859 (Minn. 2010) (quoting 
Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (“[I]f a statute abrogates the common 
law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication.”)). 
194 See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that utilities have also argued that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 
preempted state regulation of relocation costs).  Since that statute includes a “safe-harbor 
provision” that preserves “the authority of a State or local government to manage the public 
rights-of-way,” challenges based on this statute have been unsuccessful.  Id. 
195 217 P.3d 424 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
196 Id. at 427. 
197 Id. 
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First, although the franchise statute allowed it to maintain lines from 
point to point, this language did not clearly manifest an intention to 
abrogate the common law.198  Instead, the court said that the “great 
weight of authority” supported a rule that, 
[i]n the absence of an express and definite provision to 
the contrary, a utility company maintains its structures 
and rights in a public street subject to the paramount 
right of the city to use its streets for all proper 
governmental purposes.  A grant, franchise, easement or 
other right . . . is at all times subject to the police power 
of the sovereign, and unless expressly agreed otherwise in 
the franchise, the company must, at its own expense, make 
such changes as the public convenience and necessity 
require . . . if the franchise is silent as to payment of the cost of 
relocation of utilities, made necessary by public improvements, 
the cost must be borne by the franchise holder.199 
Second, the franchise statute specified that the utility equipment 
“shall not in any instance be so constructed as to incommode the public 
in the use of said roads or highways and bridges.”200  Qwest said this 
requirement applied to the original installation only; if the 
“incommoding” arose because of changes the government made to the 
road, then the government should pay for the relocation.  The appeals 
court, however, rejected this argument, as courts uniformly do, holding 
that the duty was a continuing one.201 
Third, the court noted that “when the Arizona Legislature wants to 
compensate utilities for their relocation costs, it has done so in 
unmistakable terms,” giving as an example a statute that specifically 
required a light rail project to reimburse a utility for relocation costs.202  
Fortunately for the appeals court in City of Chandler, Arizona’s 
relocation-cost statute for the light rail project was a model of clarity.  
But that is not always so.  In the Houston-area Westpark Tollway cases 
described at the beginning of this Article, courts had to grapple with a 
statute that required counties to pay for relocating “an eligible utility” 
facility as part of the expense of acquiring right-of-way for the highway 
                                                 
198 Id. at 432. 
199 Id. at 432 (quoting Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. City of Seattle, 373 P.2d 133, 135 (Wash. 
1962)). 
200 Id. at 427. 
201 Id. at 432–34. 
202 Id. at 434. 
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project, without defining what “eligible” meant.203  The federal court, 
trying to determine what Texas law would be, examined some statutes 
and concluded that the word “eligible” referred to costs.204  So, for 
example, if the utility company installed better equipment in the new 
location, the added cost of that betterment would not be eligible, but the 
cost of the basic replacement would be. 
In a later case, though, the Texas Supreme Court decided 
otherwise.205  It held that the word “‘eligible’” simply signaled that in 
some situations relocation costs might be paid by the county, but if so, 
the duty would appear in other statutes that “clearly speak to the 
subject.”206  One such statute, the court noted, was enacted in 1957 to 
take advantage of federal cost reimbursement for utility relocation on 
Interstate highway projects.207  But that statute’s scope was limited to 
Interstate highways and, as the court was careful to point out, none of 
the relocation cost would be paid by the state “if the relocation is not 
eligible for Federal participation.”208 
As the Texas court emphasized, “when the Legislature has 
determined that the government should pay a utility’s relocation costs, 
the statutes clearly delineate classes of relocations that are eligible for 
reimbursement.”209  So although the county road law did indicate that 
some facilities might be “eligible” for county-paid relocation, the 
Tollway project was not part of the interstate system, and the utility 
could not show any other clear statutory exception to the common law 
                                                 
203 See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text (discussing the Houston-area Westpark 
Tollway cases). 
204 Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 547–
50 (5th Cir. 2006). 
205 Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2009). 
206 Id. at 66–67.  Southwestern Bell tried to turn this argument around, contending that 
because some statutes explicitly required utilities to pay relocation costs but the telephone 
franchise statute did not, then the government should pay for the relocation.  Id. at 63.  The 
court disagreed, explaining that “the statute’s silence on relocation costs would mean that 
the common law rule applied, not that the county was responsible for relocation costs.”  Id.; 
cf. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 329 P.2d 289, 291–92 (Cal. 1958) (explaining that 
because the county franchise specifying gas company’s duty to relocate pipes in the event 
of a grade change was not a restriction, pipes had to be relocated for sewer project 
pursuant to common law rule). 
207 See supra Part I.C.3 (providing a discussion on highway legislation during the 1950s). 
208 Sw. Bell., 282 S.W.3d. at 65–66; cf. Artesian Water Co. v. Delaware, 330 A.2d 432, 436–
37 (Del. Sup. 1974) (the common law rule controls absent a statute to the contrary).  Under 
Delaware law, the state is obligated to pay for utility relocation costs only when they are 
incurred as a result of a federal-aid project in which the federal share is at least ninety 
percent.  Id.  On the project in question, the federal share was only fifty percent so the state 
was “prohibited under the statute from defraying Artesian’s relocation expenses.”  Id. 
209 Sw. Bell, 282 S.W.3d at 67. 
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rule making its facilities eligible.210  Accordingly, the court concluded 
that the common law rule applied.211 
D. “Takings” Cases 
Despite more than a century of case law holding that a utility does 
not have a compensable property right in the particular locations where 
its facilities are installed,212 utilities routinely advance a takings 
argument and courts routinely reject it.213  As discussed in Section I.B., 
there is an important difference between a utility’s franchise rights and 
the location of its facilities within the public right-of-way.  If a utility has 
franchise rights, they cannot be taken without just compensation, but the 
actions it takes in exercising those rights, such as the location of its 
facilities, can be regulated under the police power. 
Sometimes, however, a utility does have a compensable property 
interest in an easement that predates the public right-of-way.  A good 
illustration of this circumstance arose when telephone lines had to be 
relocated for the construction of a scenic parkway leading to the Great 
Smoky Mountains National Park.  A total of forty-three utility poles and 
the associated lines had to be relocated and of these, five had been 
installed within a county highway right-of-way.214  With regard to those 
five poles the utility had no right to compensation, for 
the law is well established that a statutory, permissive 
right of use of public highways by public utilities is 
subordinate to the rights of the public; that the original 
location of poles or other facilities in a public highway 
does not create an irrevocable right to have such poles 
and facilities remain forever in the same place; and that 
a utility company may be required to relocate its lines at 
its own expense when such relocation is demanded by 
public necessity and for public safety and welfare.215 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 67. 
212 See, e.g., New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm’n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 
461 (1905) (holding that “[t]he gas company did not acquire any specific location in the 
streets” by virtue of its franchise to use the streets to lay gas pipes). 
213 See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Chandler, 217 P.3d 424, 437 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) 
(quoting New Orleans Gaslight to negate utility’s contention that it had suffered a taking 
when compelled to pay its own relocation costs). 
214 Tennessee v. United States, 256 F.2d 244, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1958). 
215 Id. at 258. 
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The right of the state to order relocation, moreover, was not affected by 
its conveyance of the highway land to the federal government, for there 
was no “sound reason why the state’s police power should not be 
exercised in conjunction with the [federal] government’s right of eminent 
domain.”216 
With regard to the other thirty-eight poles, however, the utility was 
entitled to reimbursement, because they were installed on private land 
two years before the county acquired a wider and longer right-of-way 
that included most of them.217  So while the state could order these 
facilities to be moved, it did have to pay for the relocation.218 
III.  THE DIFFICULT NEXUS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT ACTION AND PRIVATE 
DEVELOPMENT 
In years past, governments all too often handled infrastructure needs 
on a reactive basis.  A developer, for example, might open up a large 
housing subdivision on what had been a quiet rural road.  As more and 
more houses were built in the subdivision, traffic on the road would 
increase.  Eventually, there would be demands to improve the road to 
handle the increased traffic, and the city or county would respond by 
widening the road, adding turn lanes and signals, and improving the 
intersections.  If utilities occupying the existing road right-of-way had to 
move, it would be at their cost. 
As time went on, however, governments became more proactive.  
Instead of waiting for the road to bog down in traffic, a local government 
might first require the developer to study what off-site infrastructure 
improvements would be needed as the development built out.  Then, it 
might require the developer to pay for or make those off-site 
improvements as a condition to getting needed governmental approval 
for the subdivision.219  This practice of assessing impact fees or exactions 
as a condition of land-use permitting has been the focus of much 
litigation, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
                                                 
216 Id. at 257. 
217 Id. at 262–64.  If the highway easement was there first, and the utility later acquired its 
own easement in the same area, the common law rule should still apply because the utility 
easement would be subordinate.  City of Perrysburg v. Toledo Edison Co., 870 N.E.2d 189, 
196 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 
218 Tennessee, 256 F.2d at 262–64. 
219 See, e.g., David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart Growth:  
Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 353–55 (2007); Laurie Reynolds and 
Carlos A. Ball, The Law & Politics of Local Governance, Exactions and the Privatization of the 
Public Sphere, 21 J.L. & POL. 451, 464 (2005); Nicole M. Lugo, Comment, Dolan v. City of 
Tigard:  Paving New Bicycle Paths Through the Thickets of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, 
48 ARK. L. REV. 823, 831 (1995). 
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our purposes, it is sufficient to note that governments sometimes require 
developers to undertake or finance upgrades to nearby roads and other 
infrastructure that will be impacted by their developments.220  And when 
this happens, utilities within the existing public right-of-way may be 
forced to relocate, raising a potentially difficult question:  who should 
pay for the relocation, the utility or the developer? 
A. Road Widening as a Condition of a Development Permit 
In the early 1980s, Dame Construction Company applied for 
approval to develop 715 homes on a 417-acre site in Contra Costa 
County, California.  The county board of supervisors approved the 
application with several conditions, one of which required Dame to 
widen the portion of San Ramon Valley Boulevard next to the 
development site.221  This widening project would require Pacific Gas 
and Electric (“PG&E”) to relocate a distribution line on that road, which 
PG&E declined to do without Dame’s promise to pay for it.  Dame 
refused to promise anything and went ahead with construction, leaving 
PG&E’s poles and lines in the middle of the newly paved road.222  At that 
point, PG&E moved its poles and sued Dame to recover the cost.223 
Dame advanced three reasons why the common law utility rule 
should apply and require PG&E to pay for the relocation.  First, Dame 
said that even though it undertook and paid for the road widening, the 
project had to be treated as a “governmental act” because it was a 
condition imposed by the county government.  As Dame contended, “it 
is a common practice for local governments to impose conditions on 
developers requiring various work to be done as a means of obtaining 
public improvements at private expense.”224  Even so, however, the court 
found that Dame’s development “contributed to the need for 
widening . . . the road, and the work was performed and paid for by 
Dame, not the county.”225  Accordingly, it did not consider Dame’s work 
to be a governmental act. 
Second, Dame argued that because the county would have had to 
widen the road eventually, it should “therefore stand in the shoes of the 
                                                 
220 See, e.g., McClung v. City of Sumner, 545 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding city 
ordinance requiring new, permitted developments to upgrade size of storm water drains). 
221 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dame Constr. Co., Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 351, 352–53 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987). 
222 Id. 
223 The county would not have been liable in any event, as its subdivision development 
agreement with Dame required Dame to pay “all costs of the work, including inspections 
thereof and relocating existing utilities required thereby.”  Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted). 
224 Id. at 354. 
225 Id. 
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government, which does not have to bear the costs of utility location.”226  
But the court put the burden back on Dame, finding that its “private 
development at least accelerated the need for the public improvement, 
thereby providing the nexus which justified imposition of all of the costs 
thereof on the developer.”227 
Finally, Dame emphasized that it was the county that asked PG&E to 
move the poles, arguing that under the common law rule, a utility must 
pay for relocation whenever requested to do so by the government 
agency that controls the road.228  In fact, the county did send a set of 
plans for the road-widening project to PG&E and asked the company to 
“make arrangements” to relocate its poles accordingly.229  But the 
county’s letter said nothing about who should pay for the relocation, and 
that fact, to the court, was at least as important as the fact that the county 
had directed its request to PG&E.230 
Based on these findings, the court concluded that the common law 
rule did not apply.  To craft a solution, it turned to an economic analysis 
for guidance.  Should the relocation cost be borne by PG&E’s ratepayers 
generally, or should it be borne by Dame, whose subdivision residents 
will most directly benefit from the road-widening project?231  It decided 
that allocating the cost to the beneficiary of the project would be the most 
equitable solution, “regardless whether the beneficiary is deemed to be 
the developer or a segment of the public.”232 
To begin with, the court felt that although the general public would 
benefit from the road widening, the primary beneficiary was the 
developer, “which would not have been permitted to develop its land 
without agreeing to widen the adjacent boulevard.  Since Dame 
presumably enjoys the economic opportunity that the development 
represents, it seems proper that it should also bear the attendant 
costs.”233  And while Dame argued that the county planned to widen the 
road anyway, the evidence did not indicate that the road project would 
have been done had Dame’s subdivision not been approved.234 
But even if the general public was the main beneficiary of the 
improvement, the court still felt justified in allocating the cost to Dame.  
As the court explained: 
                                                 
226 Id. at 354–55. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 353. 
230 Id. at 354–55. 
231 Id. at 354–56. 
232 Id. at 355–56. 
233 Id. at 356. 
234 Id. 
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[t]he members of the public who will benefit most from 
the road widening will be those who reside closest to it 
and most regularly contribute to traffic upon the 
widened segment.  As it appears most of these persons 
will be living in houses purchased from Dame, Dame is 
able to and almost certainly will pass on the costs of the 
improvement, including the expense of relocating the 
poles, to these residual beneficiaries.235 
The Maryland Court of Appeals faced a similar situation when 
Montgomery County required a developer to widen an adjacent road as 
a condition of approval for a residential development.236  According to 
the court, the common law utility relocation rule normally “involved 
situations in which the relocation is required because of changes in the 
right-of-way made necessary by public works projects of one kind or 
another and the utility seeks compensation from the public authority for 
the cost of relocation.”237  In the case before it, by contrast, the relocation 
was required for a private development and would work to the 
economic benefit of a private developer.238  After considering Dame 
Construction and other cases, the Maryland court concluded that 
[w]hether we adopt a benefit analysis as the California 
court did or simply hold . . . that, where the relocation is 
triggered and made necessary by a private development, 
the common law rule does not apply and the developer 
must pay the cost of the relocation, is not likely to make 
much difference.  The end result under either approach 
will, in almost all instances, be the same.  The automatic 
rule is the easier to apply and avoids the prospect of 
extensive litigation and endless discovery over who, 
among any number of possible parties, may be the 
principal beneficiary of particular road improvements 
occasioned by a private development.  Largely for that 
reason, we shall adopt [the automatic rule] . . . .  We find 
no legal basis, and certainly no equitable one, for 
requiring a utility’s rate-paying customers to bear a cost 
triggered and made necessary by a private developer’s 
                                                 
235 Id. 
236 Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Classic Cmty. Corp., 856 A.2d 660, 662 (Md. 2004). 
237 Id. at 667. 
238 Id. at 668. 
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project and thus, in effect, to subsidize the cost of the 
development.239 
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit essentially 
adopted the Maryland court’s “triggering” approach, holding that a road 
improvement project—undertaken by a private developer as a condition 
of governmental approval of a multi-use development in Little Rock—
was outside the scope of the common law rule.240  As the court noted, the 
road was needed to accommodate increased traffic from a commercial 
development and the private developers were the driving force behind 
the development.241  Although the developers argued that the road 
project was “dictated by the city for the benefit of the public,” the city 
had no imminent plan for construction and, significantly, the city had 
actually changed its long-term plan for the road location to 
accommodate the developers’ wishes.242  While the road project might 
have accomplished a governmental purpose, it was not a governmental 
act, leading the court to decide that the common law utility relocation 
rule did not apply.243 
B. Road Widening Mandated by Legislation 
Unlike the development-permit cases, a “governmental act” will be 
found when the road project has been mandated by a legislative act.  The 
City of Bridgeton, Missouri wanted to improve Taussig Road for many 
years but lacked the funding to do it.244  An opportunity came with the 
development of an industrial park in a neighboring community.  The 
industrial park needed a highway interchange, part of which would be 
in Bridgeton, and the Missouri Department of Transportation required 
the park’s developer to get approval of the interchange from all the 
municipalities that would be affected by it.  Bridgeton agreed to give its 
approval in return for the developer’s agreement to help pay for the 
Taussig Road project.245  Four years later, when the Taussig Road project 
was ready for construction, a dispute arose regarding relocation of water 
lines belonging to the Missouri-American Water Company. 
The first legal problem was the expiration of the utility’s franchise to 
maintain its lines in the public right-of-way.  Both sides, however, had 
                                                 
239 Id. at 669. 
240 Whisenhunt v. Sw. Bell Tel., 573 F.3d 565, 568–69 (8th Cir. 2009). 
241 Id. at 568. 
242 Id. at 568–69. 
243 Id. 
244 City of Bridgeton v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 219 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Mo. 2007). 
245 Id. 
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continued to act as if the franchise was still in force.  Accordingly, the 
court decided that the parties were operating under an implied contract, 
having the same terms as the original franchise and terminable upon 
reasonable notice.246 
The court then turned to relocation costs and, since the original 
franchise said nothing about it, decided that the common law rule would 
govern.247  The water company emphasized the role that private 
development was playing, arguing that the industrial park developer 
had agreed to pay for the Taussig Road project four years before the city 
council legislatively declared the project to be a public purpose.248  To the 
Missouri Supreme Court, however, the timing was irrelevant: 
The purpose of the Taussig Road project was for the 
legislative body to determine.  The Court respects that 
authority and normally does not look behind such 
legislative determinations.  There is no evidence in the 
record that could establish any arbitrary and 
unreasonable acts on the part of Bridgeton sufficient to 
constitute abuse of the legislative process.249 
And since the city council had established by resolution that public 
necessity required relocating the water company’s facilities in the 
Taussig Road right-of-way, the court held that the company had to do 
the work at its own expense.250 
In reaching this decision, the Missouri Supreme Court expressed no 
opinion on the validity of an earlier Missouri appellate decision that 
required developers to pay to relocate utilities when improving roads 
under governmentally-imposed conditions on land-use permits.251  The 
court distinguished that decision, however, because in the earlier case 
“there was no legislative determination that the primary purpose of the 
project was a public one.”252  Ironically, the industrial park development 
would add little traffic to Taussig Road.253  While that fact would have 
given the industrial park developer a solid basis to contest the Taussig 
                                                 
246 Id. at 232. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 233. 
249 Id. (citations omitted). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 233 n.3 (citing Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. St. Louis Cnty. Water 
Co., 784 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 239. 
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Road project had it been imposed as a permit condition,254 in the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s view it also served to distinguish the earlier 
appellate case where “the actions of private developers triggered the 
need for the road improvements.”255 
C. Considering the Issues Raised by the “Private Development” Cases 
Dame Construction Company made a valid point:  once there was 
enough new development in the area, the county would have had to 
widen San Ramon Valley Boulevard anyway.  The court’s response—
that Dame’s development “at least accelerated the need for the public 
improvement”—was not really an answer.256  Any new development that 
generated traffic would have accelerated the need to widen the road.  
And because Dame was standing in the county’s shoes for purposes of 
widening the road, why should it not also stand in the county’s shoes for 
purposes of utility relocation? 
But PG&E also had a valid point.  If its electric lines had been on 
private land, Dame would have had to pay to relocate them.  Since the 
relocation is part and parcel of a private development project, why 
should the outcome be any different for the lines that PG&E had been 
allowed to install on public right-of-way?  Why should one private 
business (Dame) get the benefit of the state’s police power to order 
relocation at the expense of another private business (PG&E)?  Similar 
concerns lay underneath the argument about “proprietary” government 
activities257 and the negative reaction to use of eminent domain power to 
acquire property for private development.258 
Neither the “benefit” nor the “triggering event” approach, however, 
provides a satisfactory way to distinguish privately motivated projects 
from truly public works.  As the Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out, 
                                                 
254 See Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, 784 S.W.2d at 289 (“[The government 
agencies] have taken the position that an exaction requiring each of the Developers to 
construct these right-of-way improvements is justified because they are reasonably related 
to each Developer’s project.  No Developer has objected that such exaction was unlawful.”).  
The Taussig Road project was not a permit-related exaction, however; the city gave its 
support for a highway interchange in return for the developer’s agreement to fund the road 
project.  Id. 
255 City of Bridgeton, 219 S.W.3d at 233 n.3. 
256 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dame Constr. Co., Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 351, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987). 
257 See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Classic Cmty. Corp., 856 A.2d 660, 667–69 (Md. 
2004) (likening a relocation that is made necessary by the actions of a private developer to 
one caused by a municipality acting in a proprietary capacity). 
258 See, e.g., Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny”, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 561, 562−64 (2008) (discussing the public and legislative backlash against 
the Supreme Court’s June 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
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it is difficult to quantify who benefits how much from a road project.  
Focusing on the benefit to the development that set the project in motion 
ignores future benefits.  After the road is widened, every existing and 
subsequent development along the road will receive the benefit of the 
project, and property owners on intersecting roads might benefit, too.  In 
addition, the “benefit” approach can reach projects directly undertaken 
by the government.259  Furthermore, while someone on the other side of 
the county may not benefit directly from a particular road, it is equally 
true that someone without children may not benefit directly from a 
public school.  Yet both road and school systems are legitimate public 
works projects. 
The “triggering event” approach is equally unhelpful.  Most of the 
real estate development in this country is private, and it is this private 
activity that generates the traffic that needs the roads.  In the Dame 
Construction case, the proposed subdivision was fairly large, involving 
715 homes.  So, the traffic it produced on its own might have exceeded 
the design capacity of the existing road.  But a series of small 
developments could have produced the same result, even though each of 
them, taken individually, might not have added enough traffic to justify 
the widening project or produced enough revenue for the developer to 
afford it.  It is almost always private development, individually or in the 
aggregate, that triggers the need for a road project, but if a single 
development is large enough and the traffic impact great enough, the 
government might require the developer to pay for or undertake the 
project now instead of using tax money to pay for it later. 
Perhaps the better test is the one used by the Missouri Supreme 
Court in City of Bridgeton.260  The Missouri court focused on the role that 
Bridgeton’s city council played in the project, both presuming that the 
council acted regularly and using an abuse of discretion standard to 
review its actions.  The following is a more general application of the test 
used in City of Bridgeton. 
If the government authority responsible for the road has, by 
legislation or equivalent administrative act, mandated that the project be 
built or declared that it is undertaken for a public purpose, then the 
project should be considered a governmental one for relocation-cost 
purposes.  Accordingly, the utility would have to pay to relocate the 
                                                 
259 See, e.g., Complaint by Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. against the City of Manitowoc, 2008 
Wisc. PUC LEXIS 239, *3–4, *10 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisc. Apr. 18, 2008) (“The record 
amply demonstrates that the City was engaged in legitimate city improvement projects that 
reasonably required WPSC to permanently relocate.  In addition, WPSC has not 
demonstrated that the Paul Road improvement project was substantially for the benefit of a 
third party.”). 
260 See supra Part III.B (discussing City of Bridgeton). 
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facilities it had installed in the public right-of-way, unless it can show 
that the government abused its discretion by undertaking or legislatively 
supporting the project. 
Alternatively, if the government has not taken such affirmative steps 
in support of the project, and has simply made it a prerequisite to 
approval of a private development, then its concern is primarily with the 
development’s impact on infrastructure.  In that setting, the officially 
expressed public interest in the project is attenuated, so it could properly 
be considered a private action in which utility relocation costs should be 
paid by the developer. 
IV.  THE USE OF A “CLEAR STATEMENT” REQUIREMENT IN DECIDING 
CHALLENGES TO THE COMMON LAW RELOCATION RULE 
As the foregoing analysis has shown, the common law rule that 
“utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a 
public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local 
authorities” is remarkably well-established.261  The U.S. Supreme Court 
approved it in 1905, reaffirmed it in 1983, and almost every state in the 
nation has adopted it.262 
This nearly universal support is not surprising, for the rule is 
founded on a significant public policy consideration:  governments have 
a paramount right and duty to use their police powers to control the 
public’s vital assets—its streets and highways—for the public good.  
Allowing utilities to put poles, wires, and pipes in the public ways is an 
important and valuable use, but those secondary purposes cannot 
displace public control.  If the rule is not followed, and the government 
has to pay to relocate those subordinate occupants of the public space, it 
would undermine public control and directly affect the government’s 
ability to improve roads or develop other public uses.  Accordingly, any 
departure from the common law rule should not be lightly inferred. 
When the Supreme Court considered the relocation-cost issue in 
Norfolk Redevelopment, it began with a clear statement rule:  that a 
common law principle “ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless 
                                                 
261 Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 
30, 35 (1983). 
262 N. States Power Co. v. Fed. Transit Admin., 358 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004) (calling 
the common law utility-relocation rule “undisputed precedent”); City of Auburn v. Qwest 
Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the rule has been followed in virtually 
every jurisdiction except, possibly, Arkansas); BETH A. BUDAY & DENNIS JENSEN, 
MCQUILLIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 34.74.10 (3d ed. 1995). 
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the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.”263  The 
Court noted that while this often-invoked canon of statutory 
construction is not always given much weight, it had greater force in the 
context of utility relocation because federal eminent domain law is 
largely derived from the common law.264 
We have also seen that the purpose of the common law utility-
relocation rule is to avoid inadvertently blocking or impeding a state or 
local government’s exercise of the police power over the streets and 
public ways.  It is not just an ordinary part of the common law; it is a 
rule that conserves the government’s fundamental power over public 
assets.  To be sure, a state government can decide to cede some of that 
power by paying to relocate utilities using the public right-of-way.  But 
because the common law rule is so broadly recognized, and is founded 
on such important public policy considerations, there is no room for 
doubt. A court must be convinced that the legislature really meant to 
shift responsibility for relocation costs from the utility to the public.  
Accordingly, the common law rule should be given strong presumptive 
weight, similar to the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of 
statutes,265 so that the statute would be read narrowly to avoid any 
conflict with it.266 
                                                 
263 Norfolk Redevelopment, 464 U.S. at 35–36 (quoting Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 
7 Cranch 603, 623 (1813)). 
264 Id. at 36. 
265 See, e.g., Honulik v. Town of Greenwich, 980 A.2d 845, 849–50 (Conn. 2009) (citing 
State v. Indrisano, 640 A.2d 986, 992 (Conn. 1994)) (“[W]e begin with a strong presumption 
of constitutionality. . . . we read the statute narrowly in order to save its constitutionality, 
rather than broadly in order to destroy it. We will indulge in every presumption in favor of 
the statute’s constitutionality.”). 
266 The New Jersey Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to that state’s relocation-
cost statute in the context of a road widening undertaken by a private developer.  The 
statute requires the state to pay for utility relocations on any “highway project,” which is 
defined as a project “administered and contracted for” by the state’s Commissioner of 
Transportation.  Pine Belt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 626 A.2d 434, 
436 (N.J. 1993) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7 (West 1984)).  New Jersey Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) made Pine Belt Chevrolet widen part of a public highway as a 
condition of a driveway permit, and this widening displaced some utility poles.  Jersey 
Central Power contended that the statute had entirely abrogated the common law rule. But 
the court, carefully analyzing the statute’s terms, concluded that it applied only to projects 
that the DOT contracted for and administered.  Since the DOT ordered (but did not itself 
undertake) the widening project, the court held that common law rule still applied.  Id. at 
443. 
 The court also concluded that the cost should not be shifted to the Chevrolet 
dealership.  In this regard, it noted that New Jersey’s highway access management 
regulations categorized the road widening as a capacity improvement benefiting the entire 
motoring public rather than an improvement benefiting the permit applicant only (like a 
dedicated turn lane or traffic signal).  Id. at 445.  This administrative classification 
convinced the court that the widening project had a public purpose.  The court then 
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When construing an act by a local government, such as a local 
franchise agreement with a utility, the inquiry would take on a second 
step.  First, did the local government clearly assume responsibility for 
relocation costs?  Second, did the state legislature clearly allow the local 
government to do this?267  In the regulatory context, assuming a state’s 
utility commission has the power to enact regulations or approve tariffs 
contrary to local legislation, the same question should be asked.  Does 
this tariff (or regulation) on utility relocation expressly state that it 
applies to governments?  If it does, then a court can be assured that, after 
the appropriate notice and public comment process, the utility 
commission knowingly decided to shift the burden of relocation costs to 
the local government. 
Had the Fifth Circuit used a clear statement rule, it would have 
avoided a ten million dollar mistake about the meaning of Texas law in 
the Westpark Tollway case.268  Once it determined that the utility was 
claiming reimbursement for relocation costs under a statute that was 
ambiguous,269 the inquiry would have ended, and the court would have 
applied the common law rule as the Texas Supreme Court later did.270  
Instead, the court decided to “look to other sources”271 to find the 
meaning, and those sources gave it the wrong answer. 
This Article began with the observation that courts are sometimes 
reluctant to apply the common law utility relocation rule, perhaps 
because it seems like an outdated historical artifact or an uncompensated 
taking of private property.  But as we have seen, the public policy 
                                                                                                             
concluded that “[l]iability for the costs of relocations necessitated by highway 
improvements that further the public welfare is a risk the utility companies run and a price 
they must pay for the privilege of locating within a public right-of-way.”  Id. 
267 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 273 (1908).  The Supreme 
Court stated that 
the State may authorize one of its municipal corporations to establish, 
by an inviolable contract, the rates to be charged by a public service 
corporation (or natural person) for a definite term, not grossly 
unreasonable in point of time, and that the effect of such a contract is 
to suspend, during the life of the contract, the governmental power of 
fixing and regulating the rates.  But for the very reason that such a 
contract has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto an undoubted power 
of government, both its existence and the authority to make it must 
clearly and unmistakably appear, and all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of the continuance of the power. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
268 Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 541, 542 
(5th Cir. 2006). 
269 See id. at 545 (“[W]e have examined the statute, as noted above, and find that the 
words ‘eligible utility facility’ remain ambiguous.”). 
270 Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 63–65 (Tex. 2009). 
271 Centerpoint Energy, 436 F.3d at 545. 
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concerns on which the rule is based are no less significant now than they 
were in the late nineteenth century, and over a century of legal 
precedents have consistently affirmed that a utility does not gain a 
property right in the public places where it installs its equipment.  
Instead, the utility accepts the benefit of using the public right-of-way in 
return for undertaking the duty to move its equipment upon request by 
the government. 
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